In recent years, the increasingly prevalent role of social media as a domain for public discourse, specifically regarding contentious political movements and ideas, has translated into heavy scrutiny due to concerns over hate speech, misinformation, and harmful content. In response to related breaches, discourse apps such as Twitter have subjected users to various penalties, which could ultimately escalate towards a permanent suspension of a users account. There have also been documented instances of intervention by public authority, as a result of controversial statements constituting hate speech or incitement of violence from their observations. Naturally, this has invited questions over whether social media, with its enormous reach to millions of users, is narrowing the boundaries of freedom of expression. In the case of hate speech, these questions have risen from different landings in the political spectrum, seemingly as a result of a human right being denied. A central and crucial theme in this discourse is the Human Rights Act, which protects the liberties and rights of individuals in the UK. In the words of the Human Rights Act 1998, “everyone has the right to freedom of expression” and this right upholds the entitlement to “hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. This implies that as long as the expression of one’s opinion does not promote violence, discrimination or hostility it should not be subject to legal restrictions, nor should public authority intervene. However, this does not deny that the expression of one’s opinion cannot be controversial and offensive even if they are exercising this right. Some cases have presented interesting implications regarding the balance of freedom of expression and hate speech.
This directs the conversation over to the case of Harry Miller, a former police officer from Humberside. Between November 2018 and January 2019, he was responsible for posting 31 tweets (some of which were retweets) centred around his critical views on gender recognition. He posted a barrage of short poems and statements, some seeming to mock the process of gender recognition along with the issue of gender dysphoria, others were retweets downright undermining the dignity of transwomen, making crude references to gender affirmation surgery. His tweets resulted in a multitude of complaints, ultimately leading to Humberside police intervening, based on what he had said. To determine whether this result clashes with freedom of expression, which was outlined previously, we must determine whether the police had reasonable grounds, as a form of public authority, to interfere with the outputting of one’s views. In other words, does what Harry Miller said amount to hate speech or the incitement of violence? It can be argued that the circumstances of this case are similar to the case of Harry Hammond, better known as DPP v Collins. This case was also centred around freedom of expression, and involved Hammond, a street evangelist, whose preaching in Bournemouth eventually led to his arrest. He held a sign in a busy street which read “Jesus Gives Peace, Jesus is Alive, Stop Immorality, Stop Homosexuality, Stop Lesbianism, Jesus is Lord”. The reference towards members of the LGBT angered passers by, and shortly after he was arrested. The most striking difference between the cases of Miller and Hammond is that Hammond was arrested, while MIller was not. However, we can see that there was still the intervention of public authorities present in both cases. Additionally, we can find that the High Court of the UK was in favour of Miller’s exercising of freedom of expression, and the contrary was seen in Hammond’s example. We can attempt to make sense of MIller’s ruling by considering the medium used to spread his message in comparison to Hammond’s. Miller was using a relatively small forum to spread his messages, which were directed towards others who held similar political views to his own, his followers. While his messages could cause offence, there was no evidence found that Miller was actively seeking out individuals to spread his ideology and cause offence, thereby making his tweets lawful.
On the other hand, Hammond was, again, preaching in a busy street, and as an evangelist, his purpose was to persuade people to follow his beliefs. Therefore, it’s reasonable to suggest that he was intended to spread his message to unsuspecting people, which would then cause alarm and distress, making it a Public Order Offence, as according to the Crown Prosecution Service, a public order offence is an act that involves the use of violence and/or intimidation by individuals or groups. Considering the nature of the public response to his street preaching, we can suggest that he was inciting mass distress. Additionally, the High Court found that Hammond was attempting to hide his sign before reaching the street, and throughout his entire journey, which indicates that he understood the uproar which could commence from his actions, which proves intent, which therefore makes it a public order offence. While Miller’s Twitter posts could have garnered reach over time, Hammond’s action was an example of someone directly seeking a response from a group, which is where the two events differ. This could potentially be a reason why the High Court was in Miller’s favour. Despite what the High Court found, the right of each person to be protected from discrimination and violence are fundamental human rights, it’s as important as the right to freedom of expression, which means there should be a fine balance between the two. This has been shown through Stephanie Hayden, a transgender woman who was targeted online through several twitter accounts all coordinated by one disgruntled user. They sent many hateful and transphobic messages to Hayden, and subsequently, the user was taken to Crown Court, and eventually, Hayden won the case.
In conclusion, in the realm of the law, striking a balance between upholding freedom of expression while protecting marginalised communities from threat and harm, allows for challenges and difficulties, when contrasting the often anonymous and uncertain intents of online expression with public expression, which is often much more clear and direct.
